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quity capital represents a bank’s net
worth—the difference between its assets
and liabilities. Put another way, it’s the
value of assets financed by the bank’s
owners, rather than depositors or other
sources of funds. Capital serves as a buffer
to absorb losses and prevent failures and
figures prominently in the banking indus-
try’s ability to lend. 
Banks must have sufficient capital to
back the risk of lending to consumers and
businesses. If banks don’t have enough, an
economic downturn could force lending
cutbacks, further exacerbating the slump.
But capital isn’t free. It costs money to
raise and hold. If banks maintain too much
capital, lending becomes more expensive,
and banks will do less of it. This, too,
could dampen economic activity. 
Capital adequacy is a primary concern
of regulators. The amount of capital they
require banks to hold is based mostly on
the size and riskiness of the institutions’
assets and their off-balance-sheet expo-
sures. Because banks with riskier portfolios
are more likely to incur losses, they need
to maintain a bigger capital cushion than
safer banks. This principle has been in
place since 1988, but the regulations imple-
menting it are likely to change under pro-
posals now being considered. 
How might the new regulations impact
banks in the Eleventh Federal Reserve
District? The answer depends largely on
banks’ risk profiles. The results, however,
could have important implications. The
District’s many smaller, locally based banks
are key sources of financing for small busi-
nesses. It could be difficult for these bor-
rowers to establish the same relationships
with larger, nonlocal institutions. Since cap-
ital supports lending activity, changes to
banks’ capital profiles could affect credit
availability and local economies. 
Regulating Bank Capital 
Today’s capital requirements date to
the Basel Capital Accord of 1988, known as
Basel I. The accord was hammered out by
the Basel Committee on Banking Super-
vision to foster regulatory consistency for
banks operating across national borders.1
The committee drew up broad standards
and guidelines but left it to individual
countries to implement them in ways that
suited their own systems. The United States
also adopted the standards for smaller,
domestic banks. 
Basel I groups assets according to per-
ceived credit risk, with each group having a
different capital requirement.2 Cash in a
bank’s vault, for example, is virtually risk-
free, so it gets a capital requirement of zero,
while banks must hold capital equal to 8
percent of their business loans (Table 1). 
Basel I strengthened the international
banking system, but problems emerged.
Most important, Basel I asset categories are
very broad. All business loans, for exam-
ple, have the 8 percent capital require-
ment, regardless of how risky the borrower
might be. Under Basel I, capital’s role in
enhancing banking safety and soundness
could be diminished because taking on
greater risk doesn’t necessarily mean high-
er capital requirements.
An array of sophisticated banking
products—such as swaps, collateralized
debt obligations and other off-balance-
sheet items—were either not around or in
their infancy when Basel I was adopted.
And banks’ risk measurement and manage-
ment techniques have improved markedly.
Today, most large banks employ sophisti-
cated statistical models to assess risk and
the appropriate amount of capital to allo-
cate across exposures. 
Recognizing these developments, the
Basel committee decided on a new capital
framework and in June 2004 endorsed
what is known as Basel II. The definition
of capital remains the same. What changes
is the calculation of capital requirements
for individual asset exposures. Banks, with
the approval of regulators, will be able to
allocate capital based on their own risk
assessments.
U.S. regulatory agencies have decided
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Table 1




Assets                                      in category)
Cash, U.S. Treasury and 0 
agency securities
Interbank claims, state 1.6
and local government
general obligation bonds
Residential first-lien 4 
1–4 family mortgages, 
certain privately issued 
mortgage-backed securities, 
state and local government 
revenue bonds
Business and consumer 8 
loans, industrial development 
revenue bonds
Certain asset securitizations 16 
with long-term, below-
investment-grade credit ratings
NOTE: The Basel Capital Accord has been revised more
than 25 times since its inception, and the asset cate-
gories are very detailed. For more information, see
Banking Regulation: Its Purposes, Implementation, and
Effects, by Kenneth Spong, Federal Reserve Bank of
Kansas City, 2000.
Capital serves as a buffer 
to absorb losses and prevent 
failures and figures 
prominently in the 
banking industry’s
ability to lend.that only large, internationally active bank-
ing organizations—those with assets of at
least $250 billion or foreign exposure of at
least $10 billion—will be required to adopt
the Basel II framework. Others may do so
with regulators’ approval.3
What about smaller banks? Adhering to
Basel II will be costly and complex. While
more meaningful risk measures could lead
to lower capital requirements, smaller
banks probably wouldn’t be able to afford
the necessary modeling techniques. As a
result, two banks with similar risk profiles
could face different capital requirements,
depending on whether they stuck with
Basel I or adopted Basel II.
Responding to these concerns, in
October 2005 federal banking agencies
released an advance notice of proposed
rules for revising Basel I implementation in
the U.S. This new approach is known as
Basel IA.
As with Basel II, the definition of capi-
tal wouldn’t change, nor would minimum
capital requirements. One important modi-
fication being considered is an increase in
the number of risk categories. Other pro-
posals include expanding the use of exter-
nal credit ratings and using loan-to-value
ratios in determining capital
requirements for residential
mortgages.4
Bank Capital in the
Southwest 
New capital requirements
could have important implica-
tions for the Southwest. None
of the institutions that will be
required to adopt Basel II are
based in the Eleventh District,
but branches of big, internation-
ally active banks hold slightly
more than 40 percent of all
District bank and thrift
deposits. 
All District-based banks
will likely have to deal with
Basel IA. Although the regula-
tions are still being discussed,
we can estimate some of their
potential impact on bank capi-
tal in the Eleventh District. The
Conference of State Bank
Supervisors (CSBS) has devel-
oped an analytic tool that uses
data from banks’ Consolidated
Reports of Condition and
Income. This can be used to
calculate the change from the minimum
capital levels currently required to what
Basel IA might mandate.  
Banks don’t have to report all the
information needed to calculate capital
charges under Basel IA, so we had to
make some assumptions: the percentage
of commercial real estate loans in various
risk categories, the amount of residential
real estate loans in the different loan-to-
value ratios and the exposure to borrow-
ers in each rating category. We estimated
banks’ minimum capital requirements for
two risk profiles—one “conservative” and
the other “aggressive” (Table 2).5
These labels distinguish two hypothet-
ical banks that in the judgment of CSBS
staff would occupy opposite ends of the
risk spectrum. A conservative bank, for
example, has no loans in the riskiest com-
mercial real estate category, while an
aggressive bank is assumed to have 30
percent of its loans in this category.
What Basel IA means for the
Eleventh District largely depends on the
extent to which banks are conservative or
aggressive. If we assume all banks fall
into the conservative category,  virtually
all would experience a reduction from
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Chart 1
Eleventh District Capital Needs
Under Basel IA




Percentile rank based on reduction in required capital
(B) Aggressive Assumptions
Change (percent)
Percentile rank based on increase in required capital
SOURCE: Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income,
Dec. 31, 2005.
current levels of required capital. We rank
the banks from the smallest to the largest
percentage reduction in the required mini-
mum. Banks at the fifth percentile would
see about a 5 percent decrease in mini-
mum required capital, while those at the
95th percentile would see their require-
ment drop by slightly more than 20 per-
cent (Chart 1A).
If we assume all banks fall in the
aggressive category, their required mini-
mum capital would increase. The increase
for banks at the fifth percentile would be
almost 5 percent; for those at the 95th per-








A Profile of Conservative and 
Aggressive Banks
Assumed                  Loan concentrations
capital                              (percent)
requirement         Conservative     Aggressive
(percent)                     banks               banks
Commercial real estate loans
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NOTE:  For a complete description of the loan concentrations, see
www.csbs.org/Content/NavigationMenu/Home/Basel1aInfo.htm.While the conservative and aggressive
models yield starkly different results, the
impact on individual banks could vary
considerably, depending on their asset
structures. 
To get some idea of how Basel IA
might affect banks of different sizes, we
divided Eleventh District institutions into
five groups, based on assets: under $50
million, $50 million–$100 million, $100 mil-
lion–$500 million, $500 million–$1 billion,
and over $1 billion.
Under the conservative scenario,
smaller banks would see slightly larger
decreases in required capital than larger
institutions (Chart 2). The median decline
would be 14 percent for banks with under
$50 million in assets and 8 percent for
those with more than $1 billion in assets. If
Eleventh District banks were aggressive,
required capital would rise across all asset
sizes, with larger banks seeing substantially
greater increases than smaller institutions. 
Commercial real estate loans could be
a factor in these results. Capital require-
ments in this category range from 8 to 28
percent. Banks with under $50 million in
assets average only 3 percent of their
assets in commercial real estate, compared
with 12 percent for institutions with more
than $1 billion in assets. When all banks
are aggressive, larger banks would see
greater increases in required minimum
capital because they would have higher
concentrations of commercial real estate
than smaller banks. 
Would some banks need to adjust their
capital positions? To uncover any relation-
ship between banks’ holding excess capital
and required-capital-level changes under
Basel IA, we ranked Eleventh District banks
based on the percentage of capital they
hold above what’s currently required. We
then divided this list into 10 groups of
equal size and noted the median surplus
for each. Banks in the lowest group hold
about 33 percent more capital than
required, while those at the highest per-
centile have 360 percent more (Chart 3). 
As excess capital rises, the median
percentage increase in capital under the
aggressive approach shows a fairly steady
decline. In the conservative scenario, little
relationship exists between decreases in
required capital and the amount of excess
capital banks hold. Based on our prelimi-
nary work, it appears that most banks
enjoy sufficient capital cushion to absorb
potential increases in required capital. 
Our work suggests, however, that
banks with aggressive portfolios that rank
low in excess capital could experience
some pressure. Banks in the lowest group-
ing, for example, would see a median
increase in required minimum capital of
almost 25 percent, close to their median 33
percent in excess capital. Banks in the next
lowest grouping, which now hold excess
capital of 50 percent, could see a median
increase of about 20 percent. 
Banks can adjust their capital positions
in several ways. They can raise more capi-
tal, which can be costly in terms of reduc-
ing dividends or issuing stock or qualified
debt. Another option would be to rebal-
ance their portfolios. Since capital require-
ments are based on the distribution of
assets, banks could reduce the amount of
capital they are required to hold by mov-
ing toward less risky holdings. This alterna-
tive could impact local economies if it
means banks scale back their lending. 
Getting Capital Right 
U.S. banking regulators have put much
time and effort into reviewing existing cap-
ital requirements and proposing revisions.
Both larger, internationally active institu-
tions and smaller banking organizations are
likely to operate under new capital guide-
lines in the near future. These revisions
will presumably provide more meaningful
measures of risk and minimize any com-
petitive inequities. 
Our preliminary analysis of the pro-
posed guidelines’ impact on Eleventh
District banks highlights the risk sensitivity
of the changes being proposed under Basel
IA. Conservative banks might see declines
from current capital requirements, while
aggressive institutions might see increases.

























































How Would Eleventh District Banks’ Capital Requirements Change
Under Basel IA?
Change in minimum
Excess capital (percent)                                                                                               required capital (percent)
NOTE: Groups are equal size and based on the percentage by which total capital exceeds the minimum required.
SOURCE: Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income, Dec. 31, 2005.
(Continued on back page)
Chart 2
The Impact of Bank Size
Median change in minimum required capital
under Basel IA
Change (percent)
SOURCE: Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income,
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Given capital’s key role in banks’
financial health, there are important bene-
fits for financial stability and economic
activity in refining capital requirements.
Imposing unduly high requirements could
limit bank lending, with potentially harmful
effects on economic activity. Allowing
banks to operate with inadequate amounts
of capital increases the danger of financial-
sector instability and taxpayer exposure to
failures. Bank supervisors worldwide have
seen the need to update capital require-
ments in the face of technological change
and financial innovation. Basel IA and
Basel II are important steps toward getting
capital right. 
Killgo is a financial industry analyst and
Robinson a senior economist and policy advisor
in the Financial Industry Studies Department of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas.
NOTES
The authors thank Michael Stevens for the use of the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors’ spreadsheet to calcu-
late changes in capital requirements. They also thank
Katherine Wyatt at the New York State Banking Department
for assistance and Jeff Gunther for valuable comments. 
1 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision was estab-
lished in 1974 by the central bank governors of the Group of
Ten countries. Its members today represent Belgium, Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K. and the United States.
2 Basel I capital requirements are based on risk-weighted,
rather than total, assets. The risk weights are equal to the
capital requirements multiplied by 1 divided by 0.08. The
minimum total capital required is 8 percent of risk-weighted
assets. Off-balance-sheet exposures are converted to their
equivalent amount of assets and weighted according to per-
ceived risk. In addition to risk-based capital requirements
under the Basel accord, U.S. banks must also meet leverage
ratio requirements and are subject to prompt corrective
actions designed to minimize the cost of failures. These
requirements will remain in place. 
3 See International Convergence of Capital Measurements
and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, at
www.bis.org. An updated version published in November
2005 incorporates trading activities and the treatment of dou-
ble default effects. For the U.S., the notice of proposed rule-
making that would implement Basel II can be found at
www.federalreserve.gov/generalinfo/basel2/DraftNPR.
4 See Federal Register, vol. 70, no. 202, pp. 61068–78. 
5 Our results can be considered only possible outcomes
because they depend on our assumptions, and the advance
notice’s proposals could be revised before adoption. The data
used are from the December 2005 Consolidated Reports of
Condition and Income and the Dec. 31, 2005, Uniform Bank
Performance Report. Data for small business exposures are
from the June 2005 Consolidated Reports of Condition and
Income.
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